CONSCRIPTION, the Republic, and America’s Future

The “American people have only one part to play in the Nation’s wars-that of spectator.” Adrian Lewis is a professor of history at the University of Kansas.

Though I don’t concur with all the views of this Army Combat Studies Institute article, for example despite the fact that the Pentagon lowered fiscal year quotas for military recruitment in order to be able to say they have made or surpassed Army enlistments in the first time since the end of the Bush administration,

I still do believe the Army does have enough recruits to avoid asking Secretary of Defense Gates, the Congress, or President Obama to implement the draft. That is at least until the end of the Obama administration shortly after 2011.

I’ve also posted a counter-argument from an active duty Army officer’s perspective. However, I believe that there does need to be a serious debate over conscription in our nation given the reasons expressed by Dr. Lewis. That said, this debate pro, con, and otherwise must not be the exclusive realm of those in the Armed Forces, because it is not those on active duty who decide when and where America goes to war, their job is to implement civilian government controlled authority and orders.

This is a must read, because it is no longer politicians (from the left or right) advocating the draft, but thinkers within the Pentagon and our Armed Forces now teaching young officers that conscription is no longer a political debate but a necessity if we agree with that premise or not.

All comments should be addressed to Dr. Adrian Lewis and/or the Army Combat Studies Institute that published the article, unless a reader is specifically responding to something I said.

Due to the complexity of the issue, and the length of Dr. Lewis’ research this will be a TWO PART posting.

ROBERT L. HANAFIN
Major, U.S. Air Force-Retired
Editorial Board Member
VT News Network &
Our Troops News Ladder

THE U.S. ARMY AND MARINE CORPS are too small to do all that we ask and require of them, and the American people live comfortably with a lie. The lie is that the U.S. armed forces have sufficient men and women to do their job, that morale is high, and burdens and pains are negligible. But the American people are absent from the battlefields, and Soldiers and Marines are angry. They are angry that they have had to serve extended tours in Iraq, that stop-loss policies have prevented some of them from pursuing their dreams, that there were too few of them to correctly implement counterinsurgency doctrine, that their families have had to sacrifice much because of their repeated deployments, and that-while many of them have served two or more tours in Iraq or Afghanistan-many Americans of the same age have contributed nothing to the war effort.

This is because of one fact: American political leaders made an expedient decision to place the entire burden of the War on Terrorism on a small, professional force. This breeds anger, pain, and contempt. However, these are all out of sight and therefore out of mind. The distance between the American people and their armed forces has grown considerably since the Vietnam War, facilitating the comfortable facade that the American people have only one part to play in the Nation’s wars-that of spectator. The American people must acknowledge the need to implement conscription.

Some argue that this is not possible, primarily because the United States is no longer a cohesive, unified nation, and because Americans are too culturally damaged, too focused on consumption. According to this school of thought, consumer culture has produced selfish people incapable of sacrificing for the greater good.

Others argue that conscription is not possible because political and military leaders fear the public might restrict their freedom of action. They also fear the people’s will is as weak as it was when it failed the military in Vietnam.

Consider the words of Andrew Bacevich in his recent book, The Limits of Power: “As for the hope that reinstituting conscription might re-energize politics, it’s akin to the notion that putting Christ back in Christmas will reawaken American spirituality. A pleasant enough fantasy, it overlooks the forces that transformed a religious holiday into an orgy of consumption in the first place.” (Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power (New York: Henry Holt, 2008), 173.)

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are both over-committed, stretched beyond their capacity to succeed in their missions. Constant deployments are wearing out Soldiers, Marines, and their families physically, psychologically, and emotionally.

The United States lacks the strategic reserve to respond immediately to serious threats. As a matter of national security, the country needs to significantly expand the size of the Army and Marine Corps. The only way to do this in the current political, social, and economic environment is to reinstitute the draft.

While there is ample evidence to support Bacevich’s conclusion, we must not lose sight of one fact: the American people have not yet been asked to serve. There has been no national debate on the subject. Political leaders have lacked the courage to initiate one, and military leaders are too uncertain of the American people and too comfortable with professional forces to challenge the status quo.

In the years after the Vietnam War, the armed forces became a “military cluster” (representing 0.5 percent of U.S. households), a professional group with its own unique system and set of values, ethics, and beliefs. They have fought the wars of the United States from 1973 to the present. Placing military conscription (the draft) [in standby mode] in 1973 effectively removed the American people from the fighting; be sure, they wanted to be removed. The Vietnam War left an anti-military atmosphere in the country, and it was not until the Reagan administration that this atmosphere started to change. However, the Reagan administration made no effort to put the people back into the equation for war. The removal of the people from the Nation’s wars continues to have significant ramifications, the unacknowledged net effect of which has been disastrous for the military and national security.

After the horrendous 9/11 attacks on the United States, the Bush administration declared a “War on Terrorism;” promulgated a new, aggressive strategic doctrine of “preemptive war” (really preventive war); and committed the Nation [but not its citizenry or economy] to war in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also deployed U.S. forces in other parts of the world such as the Horn of Africa and the Philippines. The Bush administration relied on forces already in existence to fight this extended war. It did not mobilize the American people for “a long, difficult struggle,” though it persisted in a propaganda campaign of demagoguery through fear by naming it such. With its Manichean, black-and-white world view and bellicose rhetoric, it effectively alienated allies and told them they were not needed.

Thus, almost the entire burden of the so-called War on Terrorism fell on the regular, professional Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force plus the National Guard and Reserves. The burden rested on less than 1 percent of 300 million Americans. Moreover, with the American people removed from the equation, it was easier to go to war. There was no fear of a [realistic or meaningful] antiwar movement such as that experienced by the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

The Bush wars are not national efforts in a way that would rouse the ire of large numbers of people. In fact, it is wrong to say, “The United States is at war.” It is more accurate to say that the military of the United States is at war and the American people are either spectators or disinterested bystanders. They have no duties, no responsibilities, and no commitments. Indeed, after declaring war, the Bush administration instituted tax cuts and told the American people to go shopping. Bush never asked the American people to make even small sacrifices, nor did he appeal to their better nature. He appealed to greed and self-interest. This was not the traditional American response to a war, and this was not the traditional role of American presidents in war.

Why Conscription?

The strategic reserve of the United States now consists primarily of air and naval powers.

      Conscription is necessary at this time because we have too few Soldiers and Marines doing too much. However, this is only a partial explanation. The threats facing the United States are real, substantial, and growing. Part of the reason for these threats is ineptitude in managing foreign affairs and military policies. The presence of American forces in various parts of the world in the past 60 years has created stability and prosperity, making it possible for people to grow their economies without fear of invasion from their neighbors. From Korea to Europe, U.S. forces have maintained the status quo. The unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces by the Rumsfeld Pentagon, while necessary to meet the growing demands for U.S. forces in the Middle East, created new opportunities for aggression. The strategic reserve of the United States now consists primarily of air and naval powers. United States ground forces cannot adequately respond to new or old threats.

U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine required four to five hundred thousand Soldiers in a country the size and population of Iraq, yet the United States was incapable of deploying and sustaining two hundred thousand troops. The stability achieved in recent years in Iraq is fragile, and the country will likely require the presence of substantial American forces for many years to come.

The Taliban and Al-Qaeda are recovering in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and NATO allies have failed to provide the forces or leadership necessary to prevent this resurgence.

The stability of the government of North Korea is uncertain. A change in leadership seems to be in progress. This always creates uncertainty in oligarchies, because they lack the institutional and constitutional systems for an orderly transition of leadership; and war sometimes appears to be a viable option for consolidating political power. Yet, the United States has withdrawn most of the 2d Infantry Division from South Korea.

Not satisfied with the status quo, Russia invaded Georgia. Russia has also worked to destabilize the government in the Ukraine and has challenged the American deployment of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Its naval forces are reemerging as a significant force. Yet the United States has withdrawn the bulk of two corps from Europe, and the U.S. Navy has committed considerable resources to the Persian Gulf region.

The United States is still responsible for the security of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China is rapidly expanding its navy, particularly its fleet of quiet diesel submarines, and has improved its ability to destroy communication satellites. It is modernizing its ground forces as well. Yet the United States retains no significant strategic reserve committed to conventional war.

Iran is rapidly developing nuclear and missile technologies and, by some estimates, it may possess the wherewithal to produce nuclear weapons and missiles capable of striking Europe in roughly two to five years.

The rapprochement between Russia and China aligns two of the most powerful nations on Earth, both of which are allies of Iran and have no affinity for the United States.

Pakistan, a state that possesses nuclear weapons, is going through a period of instability. Its new government lacks significant public support and is under pressure from the army. The disintegration of Pakistan’s government would directly influence the decisions of the government of India, which is also a nuclear power. India, too, is experiencing instability and terrorist attacks.

American influence in Europe has declined. The European Union is poorly armed and frequently seems more willing to deal with Russia than the United States. This is understandable, given its dependence on Russian oil and gas and the dismissive, go-it-alone attitude of the Bush administration. The U.S. cannot count on Western Europe to provide a strategic reserve of armed forces.

General George W. Casey, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, discussed the current imbalance of U.S. forces:

While we remain a resilient and committed professional force, our Army is out of balance for several reasons. The current demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply. We are consumed with meeting the demands of the current fight and are unable to provide ready forces as rapidly as necessary for other potential contingencies. Our Reserve Components are performing an operational role for which they were neither originally designed nor resourced. Current operational requirements for forces and limited periods between deployments necessitate a focus on counterinsurgency to the detriment of preparedness for the full range of military missions. Soldiers, families, and equipment are stretched and stressed by the demands of lengthy and repeated deployments with insufficient recovery time…. Army support systems including health care, education, and family support systems that were designed for the pre-9/11 era are straining under the pressure from six years at war. Overall, our readiness is being consumed as fast as we can build it.

No terrorist organization, undeveloped country, or failed state possesses the wherewithal to do more than minor damage to the United States. However, China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, India, and Pakistan can alter the strategic, international situation dramatically. The mere presence of trained, ready, well-equipped U.S. forces creates stability, deters aggression, and is evidence of America’s commitment to peace. The absence of American forces is an invitation to aggression. The United States needs to maintain a significant strategic reserve of ground forces ready to deploy and conduct conventional operations and maintain a significant presence in ground forces in various regions to prevent war.

The Bush administration over-committed U.S. forces and created vulnerabilities. It squandered numerous opportunities to diminish threats and secure real allies. The Obama administration inherited this situation. It needs to restore balance, and the only way to do this without sacrificing our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan is to significantly increase the size of American ground forces.

We are not in a new environment. We have been here before. The United States has a long history of conscription. Conscription has been the nation’s response to labor-intensive wars since the Civil War. In 2006, I wrote: Many Americans believe it is wrong for the small “military cluster” to bear the full burden of war while the rest of America does nothing. Hence, there have been calls for the reinstatement of the draft. As the demand for U.S. forces around the world increases, which seems very likely after the [Obama SURGE of 2009], the arguments and demands for reinstating the draft will also increase. At the end of 2005, the Army and Marine Corps were over-committed, trying to do more than was reasonably possible with current troop levels.

Obviously, I was wrong, at least, in part. The demands for U.S. forces in various parts of the world have increased. However, there has been no sustained call from any segment of American society to reinstitute the draft. The reason for this is because Americans are once again disgusted with war. Most Americans believe the war in Iraq is unnecessary, poorly planned, and poorly executed. Americans are also too enamored with high-priced, sophisticated weapons systems, which substantiate the lie that additional people are not needed for war fighting.

In 1961, on the eve of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army had 858,622 Soldiers organized into 14 active duty divisions, roughly half its size ten years earlier. In 1968, the year of the Tet Offensive, the U.S. Army numbered 1,570,343 Soldiers organized into 19 active duty divisions.

[The U.S. Army Center of Military History provided the figures on Army manpower strength and numbers of divisions].

In 1973, conscription was placed in standby mode leading many Americans to think it had ended. Many lessons have arisen from the failure of the United States to achieve its political objective of a free South Vietnam; however, one of those lessons should not be that the citizen-Soldier Army failed. Tactically and operationally, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were not defeated in Vietnam.

On the eve of the first Persian Gulf War, the George H.W. Bush administration was in the process of drawing down American forces. The Cold War had ended and the American people were about to receive a “peace dividend,” primarily at the expense of the Army. Demobilization stopped temporarily to fight a conventional war in Iraq. After the war, demobilization continued, and the Army went from a force of almost 800,000 Soldiers to less than 500,000 and from 16 divisions to 10.

When George W. Bush came into office, the U.S. Army still numbered less than 500,000 men and women, organized into 10 divisions, but in 2001, under the heading “transformation,” the new Bush administration started developing plans to further cut the Army by more than two divisions.

The terrorist attack on 9/11 put a halt to these plans, and the administration instead geared up for war in Afghanistan.

Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. Army was repeatedly under strength and ill prepared for the wars it fought, and conscription became necessary. In each case, the citizen-Soldier Army rose to meet the requirements of war, and was successful in it.

Adrian Lewis is a professor of history at the University of Kansas.

Robert L. Hanafin

Readers are more than welcome to use the articles I’ve posted on Veterans Today, I’ve had to take a break from VT as Veterans Issues and Peace Activism Editor and staff writer due to personal medical reasons in our military family that take away too much time needed to properly express future stories or respond to readers in a timely manner.

My association with VT since its founding in 2004 has been a very rewarding experience for me.

Retired from both the Air Force and Civil Service. Went in the regular Army at 17 during Vietnam (1968), stayed in the Army Reserve to complete my eight year commitment in 1976. Served in Air Defense Artillery, and a Mechanized Infantry Division (4MID) at Fort Carson, Co. Used the GI Bill to go to college, worked full time at the VA, and non-scholarship Air Force 2-Year ROTC program for prior service military. Commissioned in the Air Force in 1977. Served as a Military Intelligence Officer from 1977 to 1994. Upon retirement I entered retail drugstore management training with Safeway Drugs Stores in California. Retail Sales Management was not my cup of tea, so I applied my former U.S. Civil Service status with the VA to get my foot in the door at the Justice Department, and later Department of the Navy retiring with disability from the Civil Service in 2000.

I’ve been with Veterans Today since the site originated. I’m now on the Editorial Board. I was also on the Editorial Board of Our Troops News Ladder another progressive leaning Veterans and Military Family news clearing house.

I remain married for over 45 years. I am both a Vietnam Era and Gulf War Veteran. I served on Okinawa and Fort Carson, Colorado during Vietnam and in the Office of the Air Force Inspector General at Norton AFB, CA during Desert Storm. I retired from the Air Force in 1994 having worked on the Air Staff and Defense Intelligence Agency at the Pentagon.