The IAEA Board of Governors voted in favor of a draft resolution proposed by the six world powers to declare end to investigations into Iran’s nuclear activities in the past.
Following the voting, the Iranian envoy to the UN nuclear watchdog addressed the country’s statement on the occassion to the member states.
The following is the full text of the statement:
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Reza Najafi
Resident Representative to the IAEA
before the Board of Governors
Vienna, 15 December 2015
In the Name of God
The Most Compassionate and the Most Merciful
Mr. Chairman, Director General, Distinguished Colleagues,
I would like, at the outset, to convey the sincere appreciation of my government for the continuous support of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement to Iran’s peaceful nuclear program during the last 12 years.
My delegation would also like to express its gratitude to the Director General and the Secretariat for their cooperation and hard work with regard to the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action as well as the Road-map and their readiness to contribute to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
The JCPOA which was successfully concluded between the Islamic Republic of Iran and E3/EU+3 marks a significant step to resolve an unnecessary prolonged crisis. The main principle of the JCPOA is reciprocal commitments by Iran and E3/EU+3, ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and simultaneously terminating all previous United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions with an immediate comprehensive lifting of all UNSC sanctions, and all nuclear-related sanctions unilaterally or multilaterally imposed on Iran. The fundamental shift foreseen in the UNSC resolution 2231 would be translated here in the Board of Governors by a significant decision to terminate all its previous resolutions on Iran’s nuclear issue.
The Board has before it the report of the Agency on the “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues regarding Iran’s nuclear Programme” (Final Assessment, Doc. GOV/2015/68). While Iran disagrees with some parts of the Final Assessment, several assessments of the report are in line with Iran’s statement, including the following paragraphs:
– “The Agency has found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.” (para 88 )
– “All the activities contained in the Road-map were implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule.” “The implementation of the Road-map facilitated a more substantive engagement between the Agency and Iran.” (para 86)
– “The Agency has not found indications of an undeclared nuclear fuel cycle in Iran, beyond those activities declared retrospectively by Iran.” (para 77)
– “The Agency has found no indications of Iran having conducted activities which can be directly traced to the ‘uranium metal document’ or to design information for a nuclear explosive device from the clandestine nuclear supply network.” (para 78)
– “The Agency acknowledges that there is a growing use of EBW detonators for civilian and conventional military purposes” (para 79) and “as previously reported by the Agency, such an application [it means EBW detonators for applications in the oil and gas industry in Iran] is not inconsistent with specialized industry practices.” (para 39)
-“The Agency also notes the applicability of some hydrodynamic modelling to conventional military explosive devices.” (para 81)
-“The Agency has no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” (para 85) [Although in our view, such assessment must be extended for all times.]
– “The Agency has assessed that the activities carried out at the site [Gchine mine] are consistent with Iran’s declarations provided in connection with the Framework for Cooperation and [Joint Plan of Action] JPA and that, in any event, no substantial amount of nuclear material could have been produced in the Gchine mine before 2006. The Agency assesses that the process design [of alleged studies documentation] for the production of uranium salts was technically flawed and of low quality in comparison to what was available to Iran as part of its declared nuclear fuel cycle.” (para 30) This is a strong indication of the forgery of “the alleged studies documents”.
– “The Agency re-evaluated information in 2014 and assessed that the amount of natural uranium involved [at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory] was within the uncertainties associated with nuclear material accountancy and related measurements”.(para 31)
– “The Agency has reassessed that this [alleged] experiment was … not conducted in “the region of” Marivan”. (para 41) Therefore, confirming Iran’s statement that there has never been any experiment in the region of Marivan.
– “When the Director General and Deputy Director General for Safeguards visited the main building of interest to the Agency at the Parchin site on 20 September 2015, they did not observe a chamber or any associated equipment inside the building”.(para 53)
In the meantime, Iran disagree with some parts of the report, including those paragraphs quoted from the Agency’s 2011 November report or a few assessments which are related to scientific studies of some dual-use technologies. In Iran, scientific studies of dual-use technologies have always been for peaceful civilian or conventional military uses. Furthermore, scientific studies of dual-use technologies have never been prohibited under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We also categorically reject existence of organizational structure or coordinated effort before or after 2003 to develop nuclear explosive device by Iran. During the negotiations of Road-map, we predicted such a possible situation and for that reason we agreed on paragraph 9 of Road-map. Iran would submit, pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Road-map its comprehensive assessment on the report.
The fact that “the Agency has found no credible indications of the diversion of nuclear material in connection with the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme” (para 88 of the report), clearly shows that Iran’s nuclear programme has always been for peaceful purposes and was never diverted.
Iran has stated time and again and in different levels that it has always been the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the provisions of the NPT, not to engage in the acquisition, production, stockpiling or use of nuclear weapons. Iran’s nuclear programme has always been and will remain for peaceful purposes. The Final Assessment, indeed, has not referred to Article XII.C which is a testimony to Iran’s statement.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to fully implement its voluntary undertakings in good faith contingent upon the same good faith implementation of all undertakings, including those involving the comprehensive removal of sanctions and restrictive measures under the JCPOA. We have already started preparatory works that can be completed within 2 to 3 weeks in order to reach the Implementation Day as soon as possible.
The Board’s resolution today by closing the matter of “past and present issues” or the so-called PMD paves the way to accelerate the process of completion of the JCPOA measures.
The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to pursue its peaceful nuclear program, including its enrichment, consistent with its own plan as agreed in the JCPOA, and will work closely with its counterparts to ensure that the agreement will endure the test of time and achieve all its objectives. This commitment is based on the assurances by E3/EU+3 that they will cooperate in this peaceful program consistent with their commitments under the JCPOA. The IAEA has consistently concluded that Iran’s declared activities are exclusively peaceful. Application of the Additional Protocol in future is intended to pave the way for a Broader Conclusion like all other Member States that no undeclared activity is substantiated in Iran either and the Islamic Republic of Iran will cooperate with IAEA, in accordance with the terms of the Additional Protocol as applied to all signatories. The IAEA should, at the same time, exercise utmost vigilance to ensure full protection of all confidential information coming to its knowledge.
For the last speaker before me, you just heard an irrelevant statement, very similar to previous ones, of a representative of Israeli regime.
This regime has not produced nuclear weapons more than 2 nukes per year from the time of its inception in the Middle East.
It has not waged war or committed aggression against its neighbors more than one per 4 year in its history.
It does not kill innocent people especially women and children more than a dozen per month in Gaza and West Bank.
It has never acceded to treaties banning WMDs and has never forgone nuclear weapons because it hates prohibition of WMDs.
So you can imagine how this pretended to be innocent regime is deeply worried about scientific studies of few dual use technologies in other Member States where no diversion of nuclear materials has ever happened.
Crying wolf about the safeguarded peaceful nuclear programs of the other IAEA members for creating a smokescreen for the Israeli nuclear weapons program and its clandestine underground facilities has became its habit. This regime that has suffered the lack of legitimacy since its inception in the region, it is now, by conclusion of the JCPOA and closure of the outstanding issues, more isolated than ever. So it is not a matter of surprise to hear such irrelevant statement by its representative.
Before concluding, my delegation would like to appreciate the support of overwhelming majority of the IAEA Member States to the diplomatic process, conclusion of the JCPOA and the closure of the “past and present issues” or the so-called PMD. Iran believes that the decision by the Board today, in closing the consideration of the matter, and terminating all of its previous resolutions, would open a new chapter of cooperation between Iran and the Agency as well as other Member States.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.